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Besides his substantial influences on other fields of philosophy, Saul 
Kripke is famous for smoothing the way for a new type of Aristotelian 
essentialism. However, Kripke’s comments on essentialism are 
utterly vague and are built entirely on fundamental intuitions about 
the use of language and necessity de re in modal logic. He famously 
disproved Willard Van Orman Quine who, a few decades earlier, had 
banned necessity de re into the metaphysical jungle of Aristotelian 
essentialism – a jungle that a true empiricist must not enter. But not 
only Kripke’s refutation of Quine, but also his own essentialism is 
based on intuition. Kripke thereby overcomes an anti-essentialist 
dogma that was established by Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason. 
But because of its vagueness, one might well call Kripke’s intuitive 
essentialism a ‘metaphysical jungle’. Nevertheless, a trip to Kripke’s 
jungle is a promising milestone on the way to a refreshed Aristotelian 
metaphysics.  
1. Travel arrangements: The rejection of Quine’s anti-essentialism
In Two dogmas of empiricism, Willard Van Orman Quine rejects the 
traditional distinction between synthetic and analytic truths. Among 
others Immanuel Kant suggested this distinction in his Critique of Pure 
Reason. Quine criticizes it as a relic from metaphysical dogmas which a 
pure empiricism (as Quine wants to pursue it) has to overcome: 
[O]ne is tempted to suppose in general that the truth of a statement is somehow 
analyzable into a linguistic component and a factual component. Given this 
supposition, it next seems reasonable that in some statements the factual 
component should be null; and these are the analytic statements. But, for all its 
a priori reasonableness, a boundary between analytic and synthetic statements 
simply has not been drawn. That there is such a distinction to be drawn at all is 
an unempirical dogma of empiricists, a metaphysical article of faith.1 
1 Willard Van Orman Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” in From a Logical Point of 
View. 9 Logico-philosophical Essays (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), 36-37. 
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As a consequence, Quine gives his empiricism a pragmatic turn. There 
is no longer any necessary truth, but only some ‘web of beliefs’ which 
can be more coherent or less coherent. This is the reason why Quine 
claimed that the search for an object’s essential properties would be in 
vain. For him, the external world is accessible via descriptions only: If 
there is necessity in logic at all, it must be de dicto, since this type of 
necessity is reducible to a semantic predicate. Therefore, Quine accepts 
necessity de dicto at least “for the sake of argument”2, while he in fact 
rejects a modal calculus as a whole – at least he did so in his early papers 
on modal logic. Quine’s idea of a pure descriptive necessity is best 
illustrated by his famous example of a cycling mathematician, 
respectively, a mathematical cyclist:  
Mathematicians may conceivably be said to be necessarily rational and not 
necessarily two-legged; and cyclists necessarily two-legged and not necessarily 
rational. But what of an individual who counts among his eccentricities both 
mathematics and cycling? Is this concrete individual necessarily rational and 
contingently two-legged or vice versa? Just insofar as we are talking referentially 
of the object, with no special bias toward a background grouping of 
mathematicians as against cyclists or vice versa, there is no semblance of sense 
in rating some of his attributes as necessary and others as contingent.3 
Quine regards the cycling mathematician, taken as a person, neither as 
rational nor as two-legged. Only after one has considered the 
descriptions ‘mathematician’ and ‘cyclist’, does he become necessarily 
rational, respectively, two-legged. Kripke summarizes this position as 
follows:  
Whether a particular necessarily or contingently has a certain property depends 
on the way it’s described.4 
Kripke also showed that Quine’s approach (which might well be called 
‘anti-essentialist empiricism’) does require a descriptive account of 
reference, as suggested by Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell. 
Therefore, it is counter-intuitive. He illustrates this counter-intuitivism 
2 Christopher Hughes, Kripke. Names, Necessity, and Identity (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), 81-82. 
3 Willard Van Orman Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1960), 199. 
4 Saul Kripke: Naming and Necessity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 40 
(original emphasis).  
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in Naming and Necessity with an example from the U.S. presidential 
election in 1968: 
Suppose that someone said, pointing to Nixon, ‘That’s the guy who might have 
lost’. Someone else says ‘Oh no, if you describe him as ‘Nixon’, then he might 
have lost; but, of course, describing him as the winner, then it is not true that he 
might have lost’. Now which one is being the philosopher, here, the unintuitive 
man? It seems to me obviously to be the second.5 
A similar reasoning applies to Quine’s cycling mathematician: If he is 
described as a ‘mathematician’, he is necessarily rational. If he is 
described as a ‘cyclist’, he is necessarily two-legged. But it would be 
absurd to answer the question whether a certain person, for example 
Smith, is necessarily two-legged in the following way: ‘If you describe 
Smith as a cyclist, he is necessarily two-legged. But if you describe him 
as a mathematician, then he is not.’ Therefore, Quine’s anti-essentialist 
understanding of modality must be rejected because it presupposes a 
counter-intuitive way of language use.  
To stick to the jungle metaphor, we might regard Quine as the 
worried father who thought that our metaphysical adventure of 
exploring essentialism is far too costly, dangerous or philosophically 
pointless. With Kripke, we could say that it is our job to convince Quine 
of the philosophical benefits of such a trip by appealing to some 
fundamental intuitions – which is what I will try to do in the following 
parts of my paper. 
2. Waiting for departure: A plea for intuition-grounded philosophy
Of course, intuition-grounded argumentation causes doubts among 
many philosophers. The main objection could be summarized as 
follows: Intuitions are purely subjective and therefore random – and 
such subjectivity cannot lead to philosophical insight. However, Kripke 
gives, first and foremost, a semantic analysis of language. This means, 
he reflects on what people do, in fact, express when they utter a certain 
sentence. However, a good semantic analysis goes hand in hand with the 
intuitions which language users have about their own language. For that 
5 Kripke, Naming and Necessity, 10.  
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reason, we can well reject any analysis which does not appeal to our 
intuitions.  
To put it more theoretically, we might say that intuitions lead to a 
‘reflective equilibrium’ as John Rawls calls the relating balance of 
intuitions and theory in moral philosophy.6 This basically means that a 
counter-intuitive theory is not a good theory since it does not apply to 
most, and definitely not to all, cases of language use. Hence, Kripke 
gives a well-founded argument to reject Quine’s anti-essentialist 
understanding of necessity. 
However, it seems that Kripke regards intuitions as the unique way 
which leads to philosophical evidence:  
Of course, some philosophers think that something’s having intuitive content is 
very inconclusive evidence in favor of it. I think it is very heavy evidence in favor 
of anything, myself. I really don’t know, in a way, what more conclusive 
evidence one can have about anything, ultimately speaking.7 
Consequently, not only Kripke’s refutation of Quine is intuition-
grounded, but also his own account of essentialism – if one wants to call 
the “better picture”8 Kripke draws in Naming and Necessity an account 
or a theory at all. Anyway, Christopher Hughes claims correctly that 
Kripke’s essentialism neither refers to Aristotle nor to Thomas Aquinas 
(only to mention two famous essentialists in history), but rather to “the 
man on the Clapham omnibus”9. For this stereotype bus passenger, it is 
intuitively evident that individuals have some properties which are 
contingent and some others which are necessary. According to this, 
Richard Nixon, for example, has the contingent property of being elected 
as U.S. president in 1968. But he has the necessary property of being 
human – and not an aardvark or any other non-human creature.10 
Kripke’s intuitions do not only apply to individuals, but also to natural 
kinds. For example, ‘being H2O’ is a necessary property of water, while 
‘being liquid’ is not. I will come back to this example later.  
6 Cf. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971). 
7 Kripke, Naming and Necessity, 42.  
8 Ibid., 94. 
9 Hughes, Kripke, 84. 
10 Cf. Robert Stalnaker, “Possible Worlds Semantics: Philosophical Foundations,” in Saul 
Kripke, ed. Alan Berger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 100-115. 
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By such an intuitive reasoning, Kripke overcomes an anti-
essentialist dogma in philosophy which was established by Immanuel 
Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason and which heavily influenced Quine 
and other ‘early analytic philosophers’ like Bertrand Russell or Ludwig 
Wittgenstein. However, Kripke’s idea of essentialism remains utterly 
vague, since he – in his characteristic way of presenting philosophic 
ideas – only presents a few examples of essential properties and does not 
give any sufficient principles or general statements on his account. 
Because of this vagueness, one is well-justified in calling Kripke’s 
intuitive essentialism a ‘metaphysical jungle’ – of course, without the 
negative connotations Quine had in mind by using this metaphor. On 
the contrary, a trip to Kripke’s jungle is very promising for contemporary 
philosophy – not only in terms of logic and philosophy of language, but 
also as a milestone on the way to a refreshed Aristotelian metaphysics. 
Therefore, I will, in the next part of this paper, sketch some general 
remarks on Kripke’s intuitive examples which might be seen as the 
entering step into this adventurous jungle.  
3. Entering the Jungle: General remarks on Kripke’s essentialism
So far, I have pointed out that Kripke’s intuitions lead him to a 
metaphysical position which is, in general, called essentialism or 
sometimes even Aristotelian essentialism. But what is exactly meant by 
these terms? Here is Quine’s definition: 
Aristotelian essentialism. This is the doctrine that some of the attributes of a 
thing (quite independently of the language in which the thing is referred to, if at 
all) may be essential to the thing, and others accidental. E.g., a man, or talking 
animal, or featherless biped (for they are in fact all the same things), is 
essentially rational and accidentally two-legged and talkative, not merely qua 
man but qua itself.11  
This definition is quite adequate to describe Kripke’s approach. Hughes 
characterizes this essentialism therefore as ‘moderate’, which means 
that it stands between hypo-essentialism and hyper-essentialism (cf. 
Hughes 2004:108-110). On the one hand, hypo-essentialism refers to a 
11 Quine, Willard Van Orman, “Three Grades of Modal Involvement,” in The Ways of 
Paradox and other Essays (New York: Random House, 1966), 173-174. 
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theory that claims that only trivial properties are necessary, as for 
example ‘being self-identical’, ‘being red or not red’, ‘being warm if 
being hot’ etc. – i.e. properties all individuals have. On the other hand, 
hyper-essentialism claims that each individual has all of its properties 
necessarily – a view one might well ascribe to Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz. However, neither hypo-essentialism nor hyper-essentialism is 
what Kripke has in mind – his essentialism is moderate and therefore in 
accordance with the given definition by Quine. It seems that Kripke 
takes ‘essential’ and ‘necessary’ as synonyms – even though the 
Aristotelian tradition defines essential properties as properties which are 
non-trivial and still necessary. I will not distinguish between them 
either, even though I focus only on non-trivial necessary properties (as 
Kripke obviously does as well).  
Kripke mentions a simple principle which gives a certain hint in 
order to find out which properties are necessary and which are not: the 
necessity of origin. He introduces it in a footnote of Naming and 
Necessity as follows:  
If a material object has its origin from a certain hunk of matter, it could not have 
had its origin in any other matter.12 
Kripke comes to this principle by help of two intuitive examples: his 
wooden table and Queen Elizabeth II: 
We could conceivably discover that, contrary to what we now think, this table is 
indeed made of ice from the river. But let us suppose that it is not. Then, though 
we can imagine making a table out of another block of wood or even from ice, 
identical in appearance with this one, and though we could have put it in this 
very position in the room, it seems to me that this is not to imagine this table as 
made of wood or ice, but rather it is to imagine another table, resembling this 
one in all external details, made of another block of wood, or even of ice.13 
[C]ould the Queen – could this woman herself – have been born of different 
parents from the parents from whom she actually came? […] [C]an we imagine a 
situation in which it would have happened that this very woman came out of 
Mr. and Mrs. Truman? They might have had a child resembling her in many 
properties. Perhaps in some possible world Mr. and Mrs. Truman even had a 
child who actually became the Queen of England and was even passed off as the 
child of other parents. This still would not be a situation in which this very 
woman whom we call ‘Elizabeth II’ was the child of Mr. and Mrs. Truman, or so 
12 Kripke, Naming and Necessity, 114, fn. 56. 
13 Ibid., 113-114. 
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it seems to me. It would be a situation in which there was some other woman 
who had many of the properties that are in fact true of Elizabeth. Now, one 
question is, in this possible world, was Elizabeth herself ever born? Let’s 
suppose she wasn’t ever born. It would than [sic!] be a situation in which, 
though Truman and his wife have a child with many of the properties of 
Elizabeth, Elizabeth herself didn’t exist at all.14 
By analyzing these examples, it becomes obvious that Kripke does not 
establish a so-called ‘principium individuationis’, as is suggested in 
some literature – especially in some German literature – on Kripke.15 
According to this principle, a certain property, if necessary, can only be 
held by a certain individual. It raises the question whether an individual 
can be identified (or even transworld-identified) by its essential 
properties – or more precisely: by its necessary origin. It can be stated 
without any doubt that Kripke denies a principium individuationis in his 
analysis of the wooden table example above since he writes in a footnote 
of Naming and Necessity:  
[I]f the very block of wood from which the table was made had instead been 
made into a vase, the table never would have existed.16  
Even though the table has the essential property of being made from the 
very block of wood, the very block of wood might have been used to 
produce something different. Being made of the very block of wood does 
therefore not identify Kripke’s table.  
Also, the example of Queen Elizabeth II cannot be seen as an 
example of a principium individuationis. Even though Kripke claims 
that there is no possible world in which Elizabeth II comes from other 
parents, her very parents do not make her special among other 
individuals: Her younger sister Margaret was born of the same parents. 
Even if we take the more precise wording of “from a totally different 
sperm and egg” instead of “from different parents”17, Hägler’s 
14 Ibid., 112-113. 
15 Cf. Rudolf-Peter Hägler, Kritik des neuen Essentialismus: Logisch-philosophische 
Untersuchungen über Identität, Modalität und Referenz (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1994), 
and Christof Rapp, Identität, Persistenz und Substantialität: Untersuchung zum 
Verhältnis von sortalen Termen und aristotelischer Substanz (Freiburg and München: 
Alber, 1995). 
16 Kripke, Naming and Necessity, 115, fn. 57. 
17 Cf. ibid., 112-113. 
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assumption that Kripke established a principium individuationis is 
simply not true: We might stipulate a possible world in which Elizabeth 
II has a monozygotic twin sister. Hence it is only a contingent and not a 
necessary fact that the fusion of the very ovum with the very sperm leads 
to Elizabeth II. It is solely necessary that Elizabeth II comes from the 
fusion of the very ovum with the very sperm – or in other words: ‘being a 
result of this very fusion’ is a necessary property of Elizabeth II. This is 
the way we have to understand Kripke’s principle of the necessary 
origin.  
However, it fits best to Kripke’s intuition-based way of 
argumentation that he elaborates this principle in a footnote only – and 
criticizes it himself in the preface, which was added a few years later, as 
requiring further discussion.18 As I already adumbrated, it is Kripke’s 
philosophical goal to draw ‘better pictures’ and not to elaborate fully 
consistent theories. 
The contemporary ‘new essentialism’ which focuses on the classical 
Aristotelian substance ontology declines Kripke’s necessity of origin. It 
is claimed that substances (an Aristotelian term which Kripke avoids on 
purpose19) have to be ontologically independent. But how can Kripke’s 
table or Elizabeth II be ontologically independent if individuals come to 
existence by their necessary origin? This is how we are to understand the 
following objection by E. J. Lowe: 
I must reject the Kripkean thesis of the ‘necessity of origin’ – according to 
which, for example, it is part of the essence of a living organism, such as an elm 
tree, that it grew from a certain seed. For the seed is presumably not to be 
identified with the mature tree. However, I do consider this thesis to be 
mistaken. I am happy to concede, perhaps, that the tree could not have grown 
from a different seed, but I am not prepared to concede that it did have to grow 
from this seed, because it seems to me perfectly intelligible to suppose that this 
very tree could have existed from eternity, or could have come into existence ex 
nihilo.20 
But even if we were to accept the necessity of origin as an intuitive 
principle of essentialism, it does only apply to individuals, but not to 
natural kinds. However, Kripke also pursues a natural kind essentialism 
18 Cf. ibid., 1.  
19 Cf. ibid., 114-115, fn. 57. 
20 Jonathan Lowe, “Substance and Identity,” in Substanz, ed. Käthe Trettin (Frankfurt: 
Klostermann, 2005), 42. 
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as I already mentioned when I referred to Kripke’s famous ‘Water is 
H2O’ example. Kripke derives the natural kind essentialism from his 
reference theory (if we may call it a theory at all and not a picture!). For 
Kripke, both proper names and natural kind terms are rigid designators: 
They refer to the same individual, respectively natural kind, in all 
possible worlds, given that the very objects exist. Taking this approach to 
reference theory for granted, individuals do not only have essential 
properties of their own, but also as part of the natural kind they belong 
to. For example, a certain drop of water out of the River Thames belongs 
to the natural kind ‘water’ – therefore it shares the essential property of 
being H2O.  
Hereby, it is important to understand that the reference of a natural 
kind term “depends upon the actual nature of the particular things that 
serve as paradigms”21 – as stated by Hilary Putnam who shares similar 
views as Kripke on reference theory and essentialism. To illustrate the 
view of both authors by the water example, we can say that the reference 
of the natural kind term ‘water’ was fixed by pointing to a certain glass of 
water (or a certain river, lake, see or whatsoever). Afterwards we find out 
that either the very water, which fixed the reference, or another 
paradigm of this natural kind has the property of being H2O. Since this 
property is – according to Kripke – essential, we cannot imagine a 
possible world in which water does not consist of H2O molecules. 
Kripke illustrates this by his example of fool’s water: 
If there were a substance, even actually, which had a completely different atomic 
structure from that of water, but resembled water in these respects, would we 
say that some water wasn’t H2O? I think not. We would say instead that just as 
there is a fool's gold there could be a fool's water; a substance which, though 
having the properties by which we originally identified water, would not in fact 
be water.22 
But as I see it, the intuitive essentialism of natural kinds is somehow ill-
founded: Kripke’s essentialism of individuals has at least a more or less 
plausible principle to find out the essential properties of a certain object 
– the necessity of origin. But H2O can hardly be said to be the origin of
water – neither is ‘being an animal’ (to take another of Kripke’s 
21 Hilary Putnam, “Meaning and Reference,” in The Journal of Philosophy 70, no. 19 
(1973), 711. 
22 Kripke, Naming and Necessity, 128. 
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examples) the origin of a tiger, even though it is the essential property of 
every tiger, so to speak something that all tigers have in common. The 
problem I am targeted on is that Kripke does not give us a single hint 
how we should find out which of the various properties of a natural kind 
are essential and which are only contingent. He gives only examples 
which he believes to be intuitively evident like ‘A tiger is necessarily an 
animal’ or ‘Water is necessarily H2O’. But especially the latter example, 
is in my opinion, problematic: It is not very probable that the man on 
the Clapham omnibus would regard the statement ‘Water is necessarily 
H2O’ as intuitively evident, not even ‘Water is H2O’ without claiming its 
necessity. For most people, it is probably more intuitive to say that 
‘Water is liquid’ is a necessary truth, particularly because water, as one 
finds it in nature, is rarely pure H2O.  
However, I am not sure whether it is useful to criticize any 
particular examples and therefore do not want to continue with that. The 
main problem of Kripke’s essentialism, which I wanted to point out, is 
that Kripke refuses to name any proper principles to distinguish 
essential from contingent properties (both for individuals and natural 
kinds).  
Nevertheless, the vagueness of Kripke’s intuitive examples was 
enough to overcome the anti-essentialist paradigm in philosophy – and 
thus helped to revive Aristotelian essentialism in contemporary 
discussions. I will come back to this observation in my final outlook. 
4. A postcard to Quine: Summary and outlook
In my paper, I tried to develop my point that Kripke revived the 
Aristotelian idea that individuals and natural kinds have some of their 
properties necessarily and others contingently. I showed how Kripke 
rejected the counter-intuitive anti-essentialism which is first and 
foremost associated with Quine, but has a long tradition going back to 
Kant23. Kripke showed that the anti-essentialists contradict some 
fundamental intuitions about language use, and he also builds a vague 
essentialist theory on these intuitions. In the last part of my paper, I 
23 Cf. Richard Rorty “Kripke vs. Kant,” in London Review of Books 17, no. 2 (1980), 4-5, 
and Hägler, Kritik des neuen Essentialismus.  
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tried to sketch some general remarks on Kripke’s essentialism. It 
hopefully became clear why its vagueness makes philosophers even 
today feel as if they were in a metaphysical jungle.  
However, even though the ‘new essentialism’ movement does not 
totally agree with the views Kripke elaborated in Naming and Necessity 
and his later works, we can well say that Kripke’s analysis was a 
milestone on the way to bring contemporary substance ontology into 
vogue again. Richard Rorty writes in his review of Naming and 
Necessity:  
Just when it seemed that the [anti-essentialist] dialectic which Kant began had 
culminated in universal acceptance of the relaxed pragmatism of Wittgenstein 
and Quine, Kripke exploded his bomb.24 
In my paper, I tried to analyze the essentialist bomb Kripke exploded by 
simply following his fundamental intuitions. I am convinced that an 
impartial and open-minded reception of Aristotle and other important 
essentialists in history would not be possible today without Kripke – or 
at least, it would be more difficult to speak about an individual’s 
essential properties. Without Kripke, philosophy today would still be 
banned to the pragma-empiric jungle of Quine and other early analytics. 
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